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ABSTRACT
Since Enrico Fermi first discovered that neutrons could split atoms in 1934,
peaceful and militaristic uses of nuclear energy have become prevalent in our society.
Two case studies, Three Mile Island and the Nevada Test Site, allow for the examination
of radiation injury liability in the context of existing radiation compensation systems. The
Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, which governs civilian nuclear use,
and the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, which governs compensation for military
nuclear weapons tests, are compared to determine the most efficient compensation
system. Issues such as determining compensable diseases, establishing rigid criteria, and
a heavy burden of proof define the efficiency of each system. A compensation system
combining elements of the existing civilian and military compensation systems is
proposed, which can be applied to future nuclear ventures such as the Yucca Mountain
Repository.
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Introduction
Since Enrico Fermi first discovered that neutrons could split atoms in
1934, peaceful and militaristic uses of nuclear energy have become prevalent in
our society. According to the Nuclear Energy Institute, thirty-one states in the
United States are home to 104 operating nuclear power reactors. The largest
nuclear power plant is Palo Verde in Arizona, boasting a power output of
3,872 MW, while the smallest nuclear power plant is Ft. Calhoun in Nebraska,
which produces 478 MW of power. To place this in context, a 1,000-MWe reactor
at 90% capacity factor operating for one year would generate 7.9 billion KWh of
electricity-enough to supply electricity for 740,000 households (Nuclear Energy
Institute, 2007). Shifting focus to the military, as of February 2003, the United
States possessed 10,729 intact nuclear warheads with 274 warheads awaiting
dismantlement. It is estimated that over 128,000 nuclear warheads have been
built worldwide since 1945, with all but two percent of these warheads being built
by the United States (55 percent or 70,000+) and Russia (43 percent or 55,000+)
(Center for Defense Information, 2003). Thus, it is clear that the use of nuclear
energy in the United States will not be phased out in the near future.
The harnessing of nuclear energy, whether it be for civilian or militaristic
use, is accompanied by several policy issues. Namely, (1) Should nuclear
reactors and weapons testing be permitted close to large populations? (2) What
operating and safety procedures will adequately protect workers and the public
from harmful radiation exposure? And (3) In the event of accidental exposure,
who should be held accountable to provide compensation to those affected? By
building upon a civilian and military case study, Three Mile Island and the
Nevada Test Site, respectively, this thesis will aim to analyze the existing
radiation exposure compensation systems, judge their effective components, and
offer suggestions to improve the efficiency of future radiation exposure liability
policies.
Health Consequences of Radiation Exposure
Before compensation schedules can be evaluated, the health
consequences of radiation exposure must be discussed. With the exception of
the atomic bomb victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, information concerning the
effects of high radiation dose levels on people has been acquired through
experiments involving lab animals. While some scientists believe it is justified to
estimate the effects of low-level radiation on people by linearly extrapolating from
the death rate caused by high radiation levels, others believe the rate at which
the dose is administered may create an asymptotic flattening of the death rate at
low levels of radiation. The linear relationship is assumed in practice because it is
the more conservative estimation. No matter which theory is believed, scientists
agree that there is no distinct lower threshold below which delayed effects of
radiation and the development of cancer absolutely will not occur (Riley, 2003).
Increased cancer risk is the main long-term hazard associated with
radiation exposure. Scientists have conducted numerous dose-response studies
attempting to quantify the relationship between radiation exposure and cancer
risk. Models have been created combining a person's sex, exposure age, and
age at observation to calculate lifetime radiation-related risk. In the most widely
utilized model, lifetime radiation-related risk can be calculated by:
Summing estimated age-specific risks over the remaining lifetime following
exposure, adjusted for the statistical likelihood of dying from some
unrelated cause before any radiation-related cancer is diagnosed (Simon,Bouville, & Land, 2006, p. 54).
From this model, scientists estimated the radiation-related lifetime cancer risk for
leukemia, thyroid cancer, and all cancers combined from external radiation
sources. The estimates are illustrated in Figure 1below:
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One of the main issues related to compensation of radiation exposure is
determining whether the disease was a result of the exposure event or due to
natural causes. Thus, it is necessary to understand the relationship between the
disease and radiation. In the figure above, leukemia and thyroid cancer, two of
the latent effects of radiation exposure, are modeled. Leukemia is a malignant
cancer of the bone marrow and blood that is characterized by the uncontrolled
accumulation of blood cells. It is generally believed that exposure to fifty to one
hundred units or more of radiation will increase the cases of leukemia beyond the
natural incidence rate. In the United States, the natural incidence of leukemia is
estimated to be 44,240 cases per year. Leukemia is expected to strike ten times
as many adults (40,440) as children (3,800) defined as people under the age of
nineteen (Leukemia & Lymphoma Society, 2007). Scientists do not agree on the
dose-rate curve or relationship between the amount of radiation received and the
increased incidence of leukemia. However, evidence exists that for exposures
of fifty to one hundred units and above, the curve is linear. In other words, an
increase in the units of radiation exposure will result in a corresponding and
constant increase in the incidence of leukemia (Estep, 1960).
The natural incidence of thyroid cancer in the United States is rare - 0.97
percent in females and 0.36 percent in males. In addition, thyroid cancer has a
fatality rate of less than ten percent. Thus, it difficult to study fallout-related
thyroid cancer risk in all but the most heavily exposed populations. Thyroid
cancer risks from external radiation are related to gender and to age at exposure,
with the highest risks occurring among women exposed as young children
(Simon, Bouville, & Land, 2006). Thyroid cancer in exposed populations is
believed to be caused by the accumulation of Iodine-131, a fission product, in the
thyroid. Similar to leukemia, scientists are not in agreement concerning the levels
of radiation exposure required to push the incidence of thyroid cancer beyond the
naturally occurring rate.
Case Studies
Although the nuclear industry has had a relatively safe record since its
inception, several incidents have led the general public to be exposed to small
doses of radiation. While the stringent guidelines governing the handling of
radioactive material make it safer than handling many other types of hazardous
materials associated with other industries, the public's fear of the unknown and
unseen makes radiation an intimidating entity. In order to discuss public opinion
and radiation injury liability, it is useful to examine case studies concerning public
exposure to radiation. The Three Mile Island accident is probably the most
notorious commercial reactor accident in the United States. Examining the
events that occurred at Three Mile Island will shed light on compensation system
of civilian power reactors. In order to examine the compensation system for
military activities, it is useful to examine the Nevada Test Site atmospheric tests
that occurred during the 1950's and 1960's.
Three Mile Island (TMI)
On March 28, 1979, the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) nuclear power
plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania suffered a partial meltdown. Although it led
to no immediate deaths or injuries to plant employees or people residing in the
surrounding neighborhoods, it has become the most notorious commercial
nuclear power plant accident in the United States. The TMI accident resulted in
the reevaluation of nuclear safety systems across the United States and
spawned concerns about radiation injury liability in connection with the Price-
Anderson Indemnities Act.
Summary of Events
The accident at Three Mile Island was the result of a combination of
events - equipment malfunctions, problems in the reactor design, and worker
error. At 4am on March 28, 1979, a minor malfunction in the secondary cooling
circuit caused the primary coolant temperature to rise. This triggered a reactor
SCRAM or automatic shut down of the reactor. Immediately, the primary
system's pressure began to increase, which caused a pilot-operated relief valve
(a valve located at the top of the pressurizer) to open. The valve should have
closed when the pressure decreased by a certain amount, but it remained open.
The control room instrumentation failed to indicate that the valve was still open.
Thus, primary cooling water poured out of the stuck-open valve, causing the
reactor core to overheat due to the residual decay heat.
There was no instrumentation in the control room indicating the level of
coolant in the core. Instead, the operators used the pressurizer level to determine
the level of water in the core tank. Since the pressurizer level was high, they
assumed that the core was properly covered with coolant. As a result, as alarms
rang and warning lights flashed, the operators did not realize that the plant was
experiencing a loss-of-coolant accident. Steam then formed in the reactor
primary cooling system. The mixture of steam and water running through the
cooling pumps caused them to vibrate. As a corrective action, the operators shut
down the pumps, ending the forced cooling of the reactor core. As the reactor
coolant boiled away, the reactor's fuel core was uncovered. The zirconium
cladding holding the fuel pellets ruptured and the fuel pellets began to melt and
release radioactive material into the cooling water.
When the reactor's core was uncovered, a high-temperature chemical
reaction between water and the zirconium fuel cladding produced hydrogen gas.
During the afternoon of March 28, 1979, the reactor building pressure spiked,
indicating a hydrogen burn had occurred. A hydrogen gas "bubble" formed at the
top of the reactor vessel, which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission initially
believed could explode and rupture the pressure vessel. In a worst case
scenario, the core would fall and possibly break containment. Thus, from March
30th until April 1"s operators removed the hydrogen gas "bubble" by periodically
opening the vent valve on the reactor cooling system pressurizer. This resulted in
the release of radioactive noble gases (primarily iodine and xenon) to the area
surrounding Three Mile Island. It was later determined that the hydrogen bubble
could not explode due to lack of oxygen in the pressure vessel. In total, it took
operators over fourteen hours to reestablish cooling to the core.
Health Effects
Several investigations and computer models have been implemented to
estimate the total radiation exposure over a five-mile radius of Three Mile Island
in the ten days following the accident. Studies conducted by Gur et al., Hatch et
al, and Talbott et al., have divided the area into sectors and developed mean
likely whole-body gamma dose estimates dependent on location and amount of
time each person spent in the sector (1983; 1991; 2000). Data from a 1976
airborne radon survey were incorporated into the estimates to determine natural
environmental background dose rates prior to the accident. Figure 2 below
illustrates the estimated whole-body gamma dose people within a 5-mile radius
of Three Mile Island were exposed to:
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Figure 2. Estimated whole-body gamma dose (mR) within a 5-mile radius of Three Mile Island(Talbott, et al., 2000)
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It is estimated that over the ten day period following the accident:
Approximately 15% (5,032 individuals) were exposed to >40 mrem (0.4
mSv) maximum y -radiation... The average likely y -dose was 10.4 mrem
(0.10 mSv), with 3,539 individuals (11.1%) exposed to >20 mrem (0.20
mSV) [and] less than 2.1% received the highest levels of estimated
maximum or likely y -radiation (Talbott, et al., 2000, p. 547).
To place these doses in a more understandable context, 100 mrem is equivalent
to about a third of the average background level of radiation received by United
States residents in a year (American Nuclear Society).
Within two months of the Three Mile Island accident, the Pennsylvania
Department of Health created a TMI Population Registry to track the biological
effects of the radiation exposure on the local population. A total of 32,135 people
residing within a five mile radius of TMI were interviewed about
"sociodemographic information, medical history, cigarette smoking status, and
previous radiation exposure history" (Talbott, et al., 2000). About 94% of the TMI
Population enrolled in the Registry.
In a joint study between the University of Pittsburgh and the Pennsylvania
Department of Health, the mortality experiences of the 32,135 members of the
TMI cohort were examined over the period from 1979 to1992. Initially it was
found that the frequency of heart disease mortality was significantly elevated for
both men and women in the TMI cohort as compared to heart disease mortality in
neighboring counties unaffected by the Three Mile Island accident. However,
when confounding variables such as previous medical history, lifestyle choices,
and natural background radiation were considered, the elevations in heart
disease were no longer significant. The cancer mortality was the same for the
TMI cohort and the population of surrounding counties. Thus, it was determined
that the radiation levels the TMI cohort were exposed to following the accident
did not have a significant impact on the mortality experience of members in the
cohort (Talbott, et al., 2000).
Nevada Test Site
The Nevada Test Site, located approximately sixty-five miles northwest of
Las Vegas, is a 1,375 square mile outdoor laboratory and national experimental
center (United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security
Administration, 2007). The site's first atomic weapon test was conducted above
the desert floor of Frenchman Flat on January 27, 1951. Officially, 100
atmospheric nuclear tests were conducted at the Nevada Test Site, ranging in
yield from less than 1 ton equivalent TNT to 74 kiloton equivalent TNT. In
addition to atmospheric weapons test, the United States conducted cratering
tests to evaluate the feasibility of using nuclear weapons as a means of
excavation. The largest cratering event was Project Sedan, a 104 kiloton
equivalent TNT detonation. Atmospheric nuclear weapons tests and cratering
events were responsible for the radioactive fallout the American population was
exposed to from January 1951 to July 1962. However, not all weapons tests
produced fallout. Of the one hundred atmospheric tests, sixty-one were
determined to produce fallout outside the Nevada Testing Site compound
(Department of Health and Human Services, 2005). Since July 1962, all United
States nuclear weapons tests have been underground (United States
Department of Energy, 2000). Figure 3 below depicts the thirty areas comprising
the Nevada Test Site and details the number of tests and detonations that have
occurred at each area since the creation of the site:
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Area on the Number Number of
Nevada Test Site of Tests Detonations
1 8 9
2 144 169
3 266 288
4 40 44
5 19 19
6 4 6
7 92 92
8 13 15
9 115 133
10 57 71
11 9 9
12 61 62
15 3 3
16 6 6
18 5 5
19 36 36
20 49 49
30 1 5
TOTAL 928 1,021
Major Test Regions on the Nevada Test Site
Region Area(s) on the
Nevada Test Site
Frenchman Flat 5, 11
Pahute Mesa 19, 20
Rainier Mesa 12
Yucca Flat 1,2,3,4,6,7, 8 9.10
Figure 3. Map of the Nevada Test Site regions with table detailing number of nuclear testsand detonations per area (United States Department of Energy, 2000).
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Physics of an Atmospheric Nuclear Weapon Explosion
In order to understand the consequences of an atmospheric nuclear
weapon test, the physics governing nuclear explosions must be understood. In
nuclear explosions caused by fissionable material, a free neutron enters the
nucleus of a fissionable atom causing it to split into two smaller atoms, which are
called fission products. Large amounts of energy are released from the
redistribution of protons and neutrons in the fission products. Nuclear weapons
generally use plutonium-239, which is artificially derived from uranium-238.
According to Glasstone & Dolan, "The complete fission of 1 pound of uranium or
plutonium releases as much explosive energy as does the explosion of about
8,000 (short) tons of TNT" (1977, p. 1.17). The efficiency of a fission weapon is
less than one hundred percent. Thus, the radioactive material that does not
fission remains in the weapon residue after detonation.
Immediately after the nuclear weapon is detonated, an extremely high
temperature, gaseous fireball is formed. The thermal radiation associated with
the fireball can start fires and cause skin burns at appreciable distances from
ground zero (the site of detonation). Long range gamma rays and neutrons
associated with the fission process or that result from the decay of the fission
products contribute to the high dose rates. Very soon after the explosion, a
destructive shock (or blast) wave develops in the air and moves rapidly away
from the fireball. The fireball then begins to ascend, drawing the surrounding air
inward and upward. Air currents, or afterwinds, raise dirt and debris from the
earth's surface. As the nuclear residue and vaporized materials rise, they
expand, cool, and condense into a radioactive cloud. This cloud combines with
the dirt and debris the afterwinds have accumulated to form what is commonly
referred to as the nuclear mushroom cloud. The now radioactive particles are
dispersed by the wind (Glasstone & Dolan, 1977).
Due to varying wind speeds and directions, radioactive material can be
spread over large areas. Because they are heavier, large particles settle locally,
while lighter, smaller particles may travel much further from the detonation site.
Conventionally, fallout is deemed local within 50 to 500km from ground zero,
regional within 500-3,000 kilometers of ground zero, and global if the particles
settle greater than 3,000 kilometers from the detonation site. Since radioactivity
decays over time, the highest radiation exposures are in areas of local fallout. By
the time radiation settles regionally or globally, the particles have already begun
to decay, reducing the dose received from the particle. In addition to wind
dispersion, precipitation can result in localized concentrations of radioactive
material at or far from the test site. Finally, if the atmospheric explosion caused
radioactive material to be launched 10 kilometers or more above ground and into
the stratosphere, there is a possibility that it could remain in the stratosphere and
disperse homogeneously as global fallout (Simon, Bouville, & Land, 2006).
Exposure and Health Effects
Fallout deposition on the ground results in external and internal radiation
exposure for the local population. External exposure refers to irradiation from
radionuclides outside of the body. External irradiation occurs from "submersion in
air contaminated with gamma-emitting radionuclides; and/or the decay of
gamma-emitting radionuclides deposited on the ground" (Department of Health
and Human Services, 2005, p. 27). Generally, external irradiation from
submersion in contaminated air is insignificant in dose exposure estimates for
counties downwind of the Nevada Test Site. Since shielding by buildings reduces
exposure, doses to people are dependent on their lifestyles. Specifically, dose
depends on how much time they spend outdoors. In contrast, internal exposure
refers to irradiations that occur when radionuclides enter the body through
inhalation of contaminated air or ingestion of contaminated water or food
(Department of Health and Human Services, 2005). The largest means of
exposure to Iodine-131 occurred through the ingestion of contaminated dairy
products. Specifically, fallout from the Nevada Test Site landed onto neighboring
vegetation, which was then consumed by grazing animals such as cows. While
eating beef from cows exposed to Iodine-131 posed minimal health risks, the
iodine did collect in the cows' milk, which was unknowingly distributed to the
United States population, especially children (National Cancer Institute, 2002).
Furthermore, radioiodine ingested or inhaled by mothers was transferred to
infants by the mother's breast milk. Iodine-131, which concentrates in the thyroid
gland, has a half-life of about eight days. Thus, considerable amounts of
Iodine-131 were deposited onto vegetation and transferred to dairy products
before the radionuclide could decay (Simon, Bouville, & Land, 2006).
Numerous studies have been conducted to estimate the radiation doses to
populations downwind of the Nevada Test Site. Scientists are in agreement that
internal irradiation doses were much smaller than those from external irradiation,
except for those received by the thyroid. As previously mentioned, populations
were exposed to Iodine-131, which accumulates in the thyroid, through the
consumption of contaminated dairy products. The Department of Health and
Human Services created a model to estimate doses from internal irradiation
resulting from ingesting contaminated food. The model relied on age-dependent
rates of consumption estimates for different food types such as milk, beef,
vegetables, etc. For all Nevada Test Site atmospheric tests, it is estimated that
the total organ dose for people who were adults in 1951 is 0.1 mGy to the red
bone marrow and 5 mGy to the thyroid. For people born in 1951 (children during
the period of atmospheric testing) the estimated dose to the red bone marrow is
0.12 mGy and 30 mGy to the thyroid (Department of Health and Human
Services, 2005). Figure 4 below illustrates the external and internal dose to the
red bone marrow and thyroid as a result of fallout deposition from the Nevada
Test Site:
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Figure 4. Total external and internal dose to the red bone marrow (left) and thyroid (right)
from all Nevada tests (Simon, Bouville, & Land, 2006).
In another study conducted by the University of Utah, the average radiation dose
received by adults to the bone marrow was 3 mGy, while the maximum was 30
mGy. For children, the average thyroid dose was estimated to be 120 mGy, with
a maximum of 1,400 mGy (Simon, Bouville, & Land, 2006). As it can be seen,
scientists do not agree upon the dose received by downwinders from the Nevada
Test Site fallout.
An alternative way to evaluate exposure and consequences of the Nevada
Test Site fallout is to examine risk models. In 1997, the National Cancer Institute
evaluated the risks of developing thyroid cancer from Nevada Test Site fallout
exposure. It is estimated that 49,000 fallout-related incidents of thyroid cancer
would occur in the United States, mostly among people who were under the age
of 20 from 1951-1957. The 95-percent uncertainty limits of this estimate are
11,200 and 212,000. For comparison purposes, 400,000 lifetime thyroid cancers
would be expected in the same population without fallout exposure.
Scientists also look at incidences of leukemia when trying to evaluate the
consequences of radiation exposure. Leukemia, which originates in the bone
marrow, appears relatively soon after exposure and produces noticeably higher
rates for populations exposed to fallout than for those unexposed. The National
Cancer Institute estimates 1,750 fallout-related incidents of leukemia deaths will
occur in the United States, with 1,100 from external exposure and 650 from
internal exposure from the Nevada Test Site fallout. In comparison, 1.5 million
leukemia cases would be expected in the same population without fallout
exposure. In addition, according to the National Cancer Institute:
About 22,000 radiation-related cancers, half of them fatal, might eventually
result from external exposure from NTS and global fallout, compared to
the current lifetime cancer rate of 42 percent (corresponding to about 60
million of the 1952 population (Simon, Bouville, & Land, 2006, p. 56).
A caveat to this discussion is that even though populations were exposed to
fallout about sixty years ago, only about half of the predicted total number of
cancers have manifested to date.
Existing Legislation for Compensation
After determining the radiation doses the general public was exposed to
as a result of Three Mile Island and the Nevada Test Site activities, the question
becomes "What is the most efficient means of compensating victims for their
injuries?" Civilian power reactors are protected through various insurance
systems governed by the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act.
While there is no law detailing compensation schemes for all military nuclear
activities, the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act outlines the compensation
scheme for people affected by the Nevada Test Site activities. This section will
discuss the procedures for filing a claim under each Act and summarize where
the funding for each compensation system is acquired.
Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act
The Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954 authorized civilian control of
atomic energy. Specifically, the acts stated that nuclear power development and
management would be under civilian, private industry control, as opposed to
military control. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission was established to oversee
the nation's nuclear activities. Despite having the authority to develop nuclear
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reactors, private industry was hesitant to invest in the nuclear industry due to the
risk of incurring a huge financial liability in the case of a nuclear accident. Thus,
the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act was enacted with the
following objectives:
(1) To establish a mechanism for compensating the public for personal
injury or property damage in the event of a nuclear accident and (2) to
encourage the development of nuclear power (United States General
Accounting Office, 2004).
The Price-Anderson Act removes prevents private industry from having to incur
the total financial burden associated with a nuclear accident. It accomplishes this
task by creating a system of private insurance and government indemnities to
cover the off-site consequences of a nuclear accident. In addition, it provides
"umbrella" coverage that limits the liability of all workers connected to the nuclear
activity including, but not limited to contractors, vendors, architects, and
engineers (United States General Accounting Office, 1987)
Funding for the Price-Anderson Act
When the Price-Anderson Act was enacted in 1957, private insurance was
required to fund $60 million in liability coverage. Any monetary claims that fell
within this maximum amount were to be paid by the nuclear insurance
companies. In addition to this, the federal government would provide $500 million
in indemnity per incident. Thus, there was a $560 million limit on liability. This
number was completely arbitrary. At the time the act was passed, nuclear
insurance companies stated they would be willing to provide $60 million in liability
coverage, while Congress decided that a $500 million contribution would not
disturb the Federal budget (United States General Accounting Office, 1980).
Several amendments have been made to the Price-Anderson Act due to
inflation and more extensive studies on the cost of a serious nuclear accident.
These amendments have resulted in the nuclear insurance companies raising
their liability coverage. In addition, a 1975 amendment to the Price-Anderson Act
was passed with the goal of phasing out the federal government's indemnity
contribution. Thus, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission now requires the private
licensees to pay a pro-rated share of the damages into the Price-Anderson Fund.
This secondary insurance requires each licensee to pay up to $5 million in
retrospective premiums per facility owned per incident if a nuclear accident
results in costs exceeding the primary insurance coverage. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission is authorized to adjust the maximum amount of the
retrospective premium every five years based on the aggregate change in the
Consumer Price Index for urban consumers (United States General Accounting
Office, 2004). As of 2003, the American Nuclear Insurers informed the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission that $300 million per site in primary liability coverage
was available from its insurance pool. Furthermore, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission raised the retrospective premium per reactor to $10 million with the
maximum obligatory payment being $95.8 million per reactor per accident. Thus,
with 104 operating nuclear power plants, the secondary insurance pool totals
approximately $10 billion (United States General Accounting Office, 2004). It is
important to note that the Price-Anderson Fund is not paid into unless a nuclear
accident occurs. However, contingency plans must be in place for fund
administrators to raise the funds and expedite payment to claimants.
Payout of Funds
In the event of a nuclear accident, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
must submit a report detailing the costs of the accident to both the federal courts
and Congress. If the monetary claims exceed both the primary insurance
coverage and the secondary Price-Anderson fund, the President must submit a
proposal recommending how to raise funds for government indemnity and the
plans for compensating individuals affected by the accident. Unlike most liability
lawsuits, the Price-Anderson Act automatically transfers jurisdiction to federal
courts, despite the location of the nuclear accident. In addition, individuals cannot
claim punitive damages against companies nor can companies defend any action
for damages on the grounds that the private licensee was not responsible for the
incident. In other words, the act does not place blame on the private companies
when dealing with compensation cases. However, the private companies may
still be fined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or subject to criminal
prosecution for breaches of safety regulations. Finally, claimants are given an
open-ended time limit in that they must file their claim three years from the time
damage is discovered. In turn, a single Federal court will deal with all claims from
the same incident, prioritizing payouts and distributing funds equitably if the funds
are insufficient (United States General Accounting Office, 2004).
Since the Price-Anderson Act was put into effect, nuclear insurance pools
have paid $151 million for claims In addition, the Department of Energy has paid
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$65 million. The Three Mile Island incident, which was previously discussed, falls
under the Price-Anderson Act since Three Mile Island was a commercial power
reactor. Under the Price-Anderson Act, 3,170 claimants received $1.2 million for
living expenses associated with voluntary evacuation from areas immediately
surrounding the Three Mile Island plant. In addition, six hundred thirty-six
individuals were compensation $92,000 in lost wages. Although scientists believe
that the radiation exposure of individuals residing in the surrounding areas of
Three Mile Island were insufficient to cause health damages, $70 million ($42
million in indemnity settlements and $28 million in expenses) have been paid out
to local residents. All of these payments were covered by the primary insurance
coverage. Hence, no funds were needed from or contributed to the secondary
insurance fund by the private companies (American Nuclear Society, 2005).
Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA)
On October 15, 1990, Congress enacted the Radiation Exposure
Compensation Act (RECA) in order to provide partial restitution to individuals
affected by the aboveground atomic weapons tests at the Nevada Test Site.
Under RECA, individuals or their eligible surviving beneficiaries can file claims for
suffering related to various cancers, lung diseases, and renal diseases that
resulted from their radiation exposure. The Radiation Exposure Compensation
Program (RECP), a division of the Department of Justice Civil Division's Tort
Branch is responsible for processing claims. The Attorney General is responsible
for processing and approving or denying the claims (Jones, 2005).
Filing a Claim under RECA
Under the 1990 Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, fixed amounts
were determined for compensating individuals in the following categories: 1) on-
site participants (people who were present and participated in aboveground
nuclear weapons testing at the test site locations); 2) downwinders (people living
in predetermined counties downwind of the Nevada Test Site); and 3) uranium
miners. On-site participants were entitled to $75,000, downwinders to $50,000,
and uranium miners to $100,000 (United States Department of Justice, 2004).
Figure 5 below illustrates the areas eligible for compensation under RECA:
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Overlapping uranium worker states and downwind counties
Figure 5. Map of areas eligible for RECA compensation (Caldwell, 2007)
On July 10, 2000, Congress passed the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act
Amendments of 2000. These amendments added two new claimant categories,
modified the medical documentation requirements, lowered the radiation
exposure threshold for uranium miners, and identified additional illnesses eligible
for compensation. The two new claimant categories, uranium mill workers and
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uranium ore transporters, are each entitled to $100,000 (United States
Department of Justice, 2004).
In order to receive compensation, the claimant or eligible surviving
beneficiary, must submit the appropriate claim form with supporting
documentation to RECP. Eligibility is determined based on the amount of
radiation exposure (dose threshold), the duration of exposure, and the type of
illness the claimant manifested. The following table summarizes the eligibility
requirements and compensable diseases under the Radiation Exposure
Compensation Act:
Table 1. RECA requirements and compensable diseases for claimant categories
(Jones, 2003)
Designated
atmospheric
nuclear tests from
July 16, 1945-
December 31,
1962.
A period of at least
2 years from
January 21,1951-
October 31, 1958,
or for the period
between June 30
and July 31, 1962.
Any time from
January 1, 1942-
December 31,
1971.
Any time from
January 1, 1942-
December 31,
1971.
The claim is then reviewed by RECP and approved or denied. If a claim is
approved, the claimant is sent an "acceptance of payment" form, which must be
returned to RECP with the claimant's bank information before payment is issued.
Onsite
Participant
Downwinder
Uranium
Mine
Employee
Uranium Ore
Transporter
Uranium Mil
Employee
Certain types of leukemia,
lung cancer, and lymphomas,
multiple myeloma, and
primary cancer of the thyroid,
male or female breast,
esophagus, stomach,
pharynx, small intestine,
pancreas, bile ducts,
gall bladder, salivary gland,
urinary bladder, brain, colon,
ovary, or liver (certain types).
Certain types of leukemia,
lung cancer, multiple
myeloma, lymphomas, and
primary cancer of the thyroid,
male or female breast,
esophagus, stomach,
pharynx, small intestine,
pancreas, bile ducts,
gall bladder, salivary gland,
urinary bladder, brain, colon,
ovary, or liver.
Lung cancer and
nonmalignant respiratory
disease.
Lung cancer, nonmalignant
respiratory diseases, renal
cancer, and other chronic
renal disease, including
nephritis and kidney tubal
tissue injury.
The payment to the victim
may be offset by
payments received by the
victim from the
Department of Veterans
Affairs based on the
same radiation-related
illness.
For those exposed prior
to age 21, and
subsequently
contract any medically
recognized form of acute
or chronic leukemia, other
than chronic lymphocytic
leukemia, a period of only
1 year, from January 21,
1951 to October 31,
1958, is required.
Victims must have been
exposed to at least 40
working level months of
radiation or determine
employment in a mine for
1 full year. Aboveground
miners are included.
Additional states may
apply for inclusion as a
covered state.
Victims must have
worked for at least 1 year
during the relevant time
period.
If a claim is denied, the claimant may pursue two options before seeking judicial
review in a U.S. district court. First, the claimant may refile their claim up to three
times with new corroborating documentation that was not included in the initial
claim in order to correct the deficiency that resulted in the claim denial. Second,
they may write an appeal within sixty days of the decision to a Civil Division
appeals officer, who may affirm or reverse the decision. Alternatively, the appeals
officer may return the claim to RECP for further action if deemed appropriate
(Caldwell, 2007). As of April 21, 2008 the claims to date for the Radiation
Exposure Compensation System were as follows:
Table 2. Summary of claims filed under the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act as of
April 21, 2008 (United States Department of Justice, 2004)
Clam Tpe endng ppove %Aproed Aproed enid Tta
unsite
Participant
Downwinder
Uranium
Miner
Uranium
Ore
Transporter
Uranium
Miller
Total
t54
395
178
13
41
711
1,1 tU
11,967
4,797
229
1,104
19,277
44.6
77.9
63.0
73.6
79.6
70.6
$84,270,573
$598,320,000
$478,974,560
$22,900,000
$110,400,000
$1,294,865,132
Funding for RECA
Compensation is paid out by the Department of the Treasury from the
RECA Trust Fund. In order to establish the Trust Fund, Congress appropriated
$200,750,000 in the first two years of the Radiation Exposure Compensation
Program. Money remaining in the Trust Fund at the end of any given fiscal year
1,465
3,388
2,812
82
283
8,030
2,729
15,750
7,787
324
1,428
28,108
A Dd I A • AO •AJAHA IIA I • m•=
is carried over into the fund for the next fiscal year. The RECA Trust Fund is
scheduled to be terminated in 2022 (Jones, 2003).
Trust Fund money is used solely for compensation. Thus, several
measures have been taken to ensure adequate funding for the RECA Trust
Fund. First, the Department of Justice's administrative expenses for the
Radiation Exposure Compensation Program are paid for through a separate
appropriations account. The average administration cost for the program is $2.5
million per year. In addition, Congress enacted the Ronald W. Reagan National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 to help alleviate strain on the
Trust Fund. This Act declared that compensation for uranium miners, ore
transporters, and millers will come from the Department of Labor's Energy
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program (Jones, 2005). This
relieved burdens on the RECA Trust Fund since these three claimant categories
are entitled to $100,000, the largest of the fixed compensation amounts. Finally,
the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002 provided funding for
the RECA Trust Fund to cover a 10-year period. Instead of Congress having to
vote about appropriations each fiscal year, specific amounts have been
established for appropriation to the RECA Trust Fund from 2002 through 2011
(Jones, 2003).
Comparison of Government and Civilian Compensation
Programs
According to Brooks, redress for injustices can be divided into two
categories: reparations and settlements. Reparations are forms of redress that
include an apology for the injustice. This may be an official statement of apology
or monetary compensation in addition to an apology. On the other hand,
settlements do not concede any fault and thus do not include apologies.
Settlements come in the form of monetary compensation or an investment of
money and/or services to the victims' community in lieu of individually
compensating victims (Brooks, 1999).
Individuals that are compensated through the Price-Anderson Act are
receiving a settlement, whereas individuals that are compensated through the
Radiation Exposure Compensation Act are receiving reparation. Thus, one of the
major criticisms of the Price-Anderson Act is the issue of no fault liability. As
previously mentioned, the Price-Anderson Act prevents victims from suing
reactor operators and Department of Energy contractors including manufacturers
and vendors. In addition, jurisdiction over the accident falls to the federal district
court, preventing victims from utilizing state laws which may offer victim
protection or compensation that surpasses those protections granted by the
federal government. In addition, in some cases monetary compensation may not
be what victims seek. Instead, they may want the responsible party to admit to
their wrongdoing and simply offer an apology.
Another difference between the governmental and civilian compensation
programs is the funding for the compensation funds. The RECA Trust Fund has
money available for immediate use. The balance is handled by the U.S.
Treasury. On the other hand, the Price-Anderson Trust Fund has a balance of
zero. The Price-Anderson Fund is not paid into until an accident occurs. If the
damages of the nuclear accident exceed the $300 million primary insurance
covers, the operators of the 104 operating nuclear reactors covered under the
Price-Anderson Act must pay up to $95.8 million per reactor to cover costs in
retrospective premiums capped at $10 million per year. However, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission does not verify whether or not the nuclear reactors have
$10 million available for immediate disposal to compensate victims. Instead, the
private companies simply need to provide a contingency plan on how they intend
to raise the money. Thus, it is unclear whether or not the money for secondary
insurance would even be available to compensate victims in the event of a
serious accident. Most likely, Congress, and thus the taxpayers, would have to
foot the bill for the compensation fund. With that said, the Price-Anderson Act is
very vague concerning the government's financial role in the event of insufficient
funds from the nuclear industry. In fact, most of the Price-Anderson amendments
have focused on phasing out government involvement in the fund.
Another concern when dealing with radiological accidents is the statute of
limitations. As previously mentioned, many radiation induced diseases take years
to manifest symptoms in the victim. According to the Radiation Exposure
Compensation Act, the victim or their surviving beneficiary may file the claim.
Since the atmospheric tests conducted at the Nevada Test Site ended in the 60s,
there seems to be no statute of limitations for filing a claim. The only set limit on
compensation is the fact that the RECA Trust Fund will be terminated in 2022
(Jones, 2003). It is safe to assume that seventy years is ample time for radiation
induced diseases to manifest and for documents supporting the claim to be
collected. In contrast, under the Price-Anderson Act, claimants are given an
open-ended time limit in that they must file their claim three years from the time
damage is discovered. The beginning of the three years is difficult to establish if
symptoms begin to manifest, but the disease is not properly diagnosed until a
later date. In other words, does this mean that the three years begins when a
victim displays signs of anemia or when the victim is officially diagnosed with
leukemia? Moreover, if the victim dies before filing a claim, the procedures for a
surviving beneficiary to file a claim are unclear.
Controversial Issues Concerning Compensation
The problem with developing a single compensation system to service
both civilian and military nuclear ventures is that no one seems to agree on the
best method for processing claims and issuing payouts. The parties responsible
for exposing nearby populations to radioactive release do not want to pay for
medical bills if it is not conclusive that the disease was caused by the radioactive
release. Thus, the three main issues of controversy are: (1) What diseases
should be compensated? (2) Who is eligible for compensation? (3) How do
people prove their eligibility?
What Should Be Compensated?
Leukemia and Other Cancers
Under the existing compensation systems, leukemia and other cancers
are compensable if the claimant can document radiation exposure significant
enough to induce cancer. The exposure level required to induce cancer is
debatable, but in the Three Mile Island class action lawsuit, the required dose
was stated to be in excess of ten Rems (Public Broadcasting Service). While
some scientists disagree on the causal relationship between low-level irradiation
and some cancers, there seems to be a correlation between lodine-131 exposure
and thyroid cancer as well as Strontium-90 exposure and bone cancer (Estep,
1960).
Even if causation can be established between exposure and cancer
induction, the question becomes, "At what stage of the illness is compensation
justifiable?" To explain, in typical worker's compensation programs, workers are
compensated for loss of wages or disabilities. However, if a worker develops
leukemia due to nuclear activities, they will not experience decreased earning
capacity until a long period after exposure. According to Estep,
In the case of chronic leukemia, real disability lasts perhaps only two
months before death. An acute leukemia victim, however, will be disabled
several months between onslaught and death if untreated, but still less
than a year even if treated (1960, p. 267).
To further complicate the situation, chronic or acute leukemia may not manifest
until after retirement. Thus, there is no decrease in earning capacity. The
treatment for chronic leukemia is relatively inexpensive out-treatment care.
However, acute leukemia often requires hospitalization and is substantially more
expensive (Estep, 1960). Administers of a radiation compensation system must
decide whether or not to compensate chronic and acute leukemia victims for the
same amount. They must also decide if only treatment expenses will be
compensated or additional funds will be appropriated for pain and suffering. If
additional funds are granted, should people be given a predetermined sum for
pain and suffering or be compensated a certain amount per day of suffering until
death? It is clear that these questions have no definite right or wrong answer.
Increased Susceptibility to Disease
Scientists generally agree that significant radiation exposure increases a
person's general susceptibility to diseases when he may be exposure to in the
future. To illustrate why increased susceptibility to disease may be compensable,
Estep provides the example of a pharmaceutical employee that has experienced
significant radiation exposure. After exposure, it may be unsafe for the
pharmaceutical employee to continue working in the laboratory due to the higher
than normal chance of being exposed to diseases in that particular work
environment. Similarly, doctors, nurses, ambulance workers, or anyone else in
the medical field may find it difficult to continue their profession knowing that the
radiation exposure they experienced makes them more susceptible to contract
diseases they come in contact with. Thus, the question becomes whether or not
increased susceptibility to disease is like a disability in that it prevents the
exposed individual from performing their job duties.
Although there is no decreased earning capacity if they choose to stay in
the same job position, what is compensable should they choose to switch
professions? Should change in pay rate, education expenses, or pain and
suffering for having to abandon a beloved career be compensable? Clearly it is
impossible to prove that the exposed individual would contract a disease in the
future because of their previous radiation exposure. Increased susceptibility
should not be compensated unless a disease manifests in the exposed
individual.
Shortened Life Span
Although many scientists agree that irradiation shortens a victim's life
expectancy, there is no consensus as to what levels of irradiation corresponds to
how many days lost in a victim's life span. Thus, shortened life span should not
be compensable unless a person experiences accelerated demise associated
with a certain radiation induced disease. Once again, there is no way to prove
that an individual would have lived longer without radiation exposure, unless they
died from a disease known to be radiation induced.
Sterility and Genetic Damage
Many scientists believe that irradiation can impair the ability to have
children. In addition, radiation exposure may increase the chance of having
deformed offspring (Estep, 1960). Unless the victim produced healthy children
prior to radiation exposure, it will be difficult to prove that irradiation, rather than
naturally occurring biological factors, caused the sterility or deformation of the
offspring. While parents caring for a deformed child should be compensated to
help with child care and living expenses, sterility should not be compensated.
Compensating sterility would involve having to determine the monetary value of a
child's life. In addition, it is impossible to determine how many children the
claimant would have had if they were never exposed to radiation.
In addition to sterility, genetic damage may result from overexposure to
radiation. Genetic damages include "cleft palate, club food, cross-eyes, mental
deficiency, or any one of perhaps hundreds of identifiable deformities" (Estep,
1960, p. 265). Since mutations are often harmful to man, radiation induced
increases in the normal mutation rate often result in latent, non-specific
deformities or death. While scientists agree high levels of radiation exposure
during pregnancy can harm the fetus, it is unclear how many generations in the
future will suffer as a result of the irradiation of the pregnant woman. In other
words, there is a possibility that the genetic mutation will be passed along to
future generations either creating deformities in their offspring or preventing them
from reproducing. It would be a bureaucratic nightmare to have to track and
compensate five, ten, or twenty generations beyond the initial victim's exposure.
The government and civilian nuclear companies should only be held liable to
compensate the generation immediately following the exposed individual.
Rigid Criteria
Many compensation systems, such as the RECA Trust Fund place strict
eligibility criteria such as limitations on the types of diseases that will be
compensated, the duration of stay in a certain area, and the levels of exposure
an individual receives. While the most harmful civilian radiological incident, Three
Mile Island, did release radionuclides into the surrounding area, most scientists
agree the levels were not high enough to induce any diseases in the general
public. Thus, this section on eligibility requirements is primarily focused on the
claimants downwind of the Nevada Test Site.
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A major criticism of RECA is that only certain diseases are compensable.
Thus, even if a claimant lived in the correct geographical area for the required
time frame, they will not be compensated if they do not have one of the qualifying
diseases. This is referred to by downwinders as having the "wrong kind of
cancer." In her investigations, Boutte took a woman's statement who explained:
My father never had a problem and then boom, he had brain cancer. They
told us it wasn't caused by fallout, but then my mother got cancer and they
paid us because it was the right kind for compensation (Boutte, 2002, p.
41).
Hence, although the woman's mother and father both met the eligibility
requirements of geographical location and time frame, only her mother's breast
cancer was compensated, while her father's brain cancer was not on the list of
RECA diseases. Both died from the radiation-induced cancers, but one was told
he did not have the "right kind of cancer."
Another problem downwinders encounter when seeking compensation is
having the "right cancer in the wrong place." Although scientists agree that fallout
from the Nevada Test Site was carried across the entire continental United
States (see Figure 4), only certain counties are eligible for compensation under
RECA. Due to heavy rainstorms, there were certain "hot spots" for radioactive
iodine exposure in areas such as Idaho, Colorado, Montana, South Dakota, and
Utah. While many people in these areas have developed thyroid cancer, a
compensable disease, they are ineligible for compensation under RECA because
they do not live in one of the counties designated as an affected area.
Finally, there have been some cases where individuals are diagnosed with
a compensable disease, but do not meet the age-specific deadlines for exposure.
For example, Boutte interviewed a woman who just turned forty when she was
exposed to fallout (2002). At the age of eighty-nine, she was diagnosed with
breast cancer, a compensable disease, but was denied compensation because
she missed the age exposure deadline by a few months. While the incidence of
naturally occurring cancer does increase with age, larger extensions to the
statute of limitations for filing for compensation should be granted in cases of
latent manifestation of compensable diseases.
Burden of Proof
Once the eligibility requirements for compensation are established,
claimants must prove their eligibility. This burden of proof takes the form of
compiling detailed medical records, documenting residence in a designated area,
and determining physical presence in an area during specific time periods. Since
many effects of radiation are latent, claimants may be asked to provide these
documents years later, which often proves to be troublesome.
In some cases, medical terminology changes affect eligibility. For
example, in 1971, a man was diagnosed with fibrosarcoma, a non-compensable
disease. He underwent surgery and follow-up visits for treatment. Years later, the
symptoms diagnosed as fibrosarcoma would be diagnosed as non-Hodgkin's
lymphoma, a compensable disease. However, since non-Hodgkin's lymphoma
did not exist in 1971, and physicians' records were not as detailed as they are
now, there are no records indicating the man suffered from non-Hodgkin's
lymphoma. Although the family doctor wrote a note explaining the change in
medical terminology, the Justice Department rejected the claim on the basis that
the document was not "contemporaneous" (Boutte, 2002). Physicians familiar
with changes in medical nomenclature should be added to compensation
committees to ensure that medical terminology does not prevent compensation
where it is due.
Another common problem encountered when claimants seek
compensation is their inability to provide documents proving residence. In many
cases, claimants may have lived with friends or family. Thus, there are no utility
bills or property taxes in their name. Affidavits from neighbors testifying to the
claimants' residence in the area at the time are not sufficient proof to establish
residency. In addition, people who were just visiting or driving through the area at
the time may have been exposed to equal amounts of radiation as the
surrounding population if they were present when a radioactive cloud passed by.
However, they will never be able to prove a physical presence in the area. Thus,
even if these claimants suffer or die from compensable diseases, they are
ineligible for compensation.
In an attempt to exclude compensation of diseases that were caused by
lifestyle choices such as smoking or alcohol consumption, claimants are asked
about how much they smoked, how much alcohol they drank, and in some cases
are asked to prove the estimates are true. This applies more to the Radiation
Exposure Compensation Act than the Price-Anderson Act. Under the 1990
version of RECA, many miners were excluded from compensation based on the
rigid definition of a smoker being "one pack per year in a lifetime" (Brugge &
Goble, 2003). In addition, many claimants were unable to prove that they did not
consume alcohol unless they were active members of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, which prohibits alcohol consumption by members. Once
again, claims are filed decades after the event. Is it fair to ask people to
document their lifestyle twenty or thirty years ago?
Native Americans
Thus far, the discussion has centered around populations residing in cities
and towns neighboring the source of the radiation exposure. Especially where
the Nevada Test Site is concerned, special consideration must be given to Native
American populations in the surrounding area. Often they do not seek the help of
a licensed medical professional, opting to deal with the alternative medicine
"doctor" in their tribe. Thus, there are no official medical records documenting
their illnesses. In addition, for claims made by surviving beneficiaries, documents
proving relationships must be provided. In many cases, Native Americans are
unable to provide marriage licenses, birth certificates, or even death certificates
to document their claim. The question then becomes, "How should claims made
by tribal populations be handled?"
Legal Precedents
Throughout the history of the nuclear industry in the United States, the
general public has always perceived low-level radiation from a nuclear facility as
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more dangerous than those from other practices including medical x-rays or
sunbathing. After the incidents at the Nevada Test Site and Three Mile Island
questions began to arise about extending worker's compensation to cover
radiation induced injuries and developing a system to assure the public adequate
funding for compensation in case of a nuclear accident. Initially, the first law suits
filed against the nuclear industry were to compensate for economic losses or
structural damage to property. In 1951, uranium miners at the Nevada Test Site
began filing claims for lost wages due to mines being temporarily shut down or
permanently abandoned due to high levels of radioactivity. In 1956, in the case
Bullock v. United States, sheep ranchers sued the government under the Federal
Tort Claims Act for livestock injuries and deaths. The ranchers' claim was
rejected because they could not meet the heavy burden of proof that the
government's atmospheric testing caused the death of their livestock (Titus,
1986).
The general public did not begin associating radiation exposure with
health effects until the 1970's, almost twenty years after atmospheric testing at
the Nevada Test Site began. In 1972, the health consequences of radiation
exposure were made public by the cases Nunamaker v. United States and
Robert v. United States. These two cases focused on an incident that occurred In
December 1970, when an underground shot named Baneberry vented
unexpectedly, contaminating hundreds of test site workers. Nunamaker and
Robert developed leukemia, allegedly due to high levels of radiation exposure
that day. Although both men died of leukemia in 1974, their widows pursued the
$8 million lawsuit against the federal government until 1983. Although the federal
court ruled that the government neglected to evacuate and decontaminate the
area in a timely manner, the radiation exposures were not high enough to cause
the workers' leukemia. As a result, the plaintiffs were not compensated for
damage (Boutte, 2002). Furthermore, a precedent was set that mere exposure
would not be enough for compensation; instead, victims must be exposed to
certain levels of radiation in order to establish causation.
The Nevada Test Site
By 1980, approximately 1,000 claims were filed against the United States
government for injuries allegedly induced by the atmospheric nuclear weapons
testing program (U.S. House of Representatives, 1980). In 1979, a class action
lawsuit, Irene H. Allen et al v the United States, was filed by 1,2000 plaintiffs who
were exposed to varying amounts of radiation as a result of atmospheric
weapons testing at the Nevada Test Site. From the pool of plaintiffs, twenty-four
test cases were selected representing the most common types of injuries and
deaths allegedly caused by the NTS fallout. In 1984, ten plaintiffs were awarded
$2.66 million after the judge ruled the government liable for eight cases of
leukemia, one of thyroid cancer, and one of breast cancer (Titus, 1986). For the
remaining fourteen cases, the proof of causation was found to be insufficient.
However, the judgment was reversed on appeal and the Supreme Court refused
to hear the case in 1988 (Fradkin, 1989).
The significance of the Allen case was the recognition that direct proof of
causation was impossible. The Court ruled:
Where a defendant who negligently creates a radiation hazard which puts
an identifiable population group at increased risk, and a member of that
group develops a biological condition which is consistent with having been
caused by the hazard to which he has been negligently subjected, such
consistency having been demonstrated by substantial appropriate,
persuasive and connecting factors, a fact finder may reasonably conclude
that the hazard caused the condition absent persuasive proof to the
contrary offered by the defendant(Schaffer, 1985, p. 273).
In other words, the court eliminated the requirement of proving causation,
replacing it with a requirement to demonstrate a 'consistency' between the risk
associated with the defendant's actions and the injury sustained by the plaintiff.
Thus, the defendant is required to rebut the inference of causation. According to
Riley, this contradicts the Price Anderson Act that governs civilian nuclear power
plants. Under the Price-Anderson Act, the claimant must prove that the injury
resulted from the nuclear accident in question (Riley, 2003).
The principle of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant was extended
to the case Sindell v Abbott Laboratories. In this case, the plaintiff developed
cancer after ingesting DES when pregnant had ingested DES when pregnant, but
was unable to present evidence linking her injury to a particular drug
manufacturer. Each of the nine manufacturers sued had to gather evidence
absolving them of the incident. If the burden of proof could not be met, the
manufacturer was held liable for a proportion of its share of the DES market
(Riley, 2003).
Congressional Hearings
In 1978, Congressman Tim Carter from Kentucky organized a
Congressional hearing discussing military personnel involvement in the nuclear
testing program. For the first time, the military and Atomic Energy Commission
admitted that mistakes were made concerning atmospheric testing (Titus,
1986). In 1979, Congressional hearings were held to discuss the health effects
of low level radiation on the general public downwind of the Nevada Test Site.
The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations concluded that:
1) the federal government had been negligent during the atmospheric
testing of nuclear weapons at the Nevada site; 2) exposure to fallout from
the atomospheric (sic) tests in Nevada was, more likely than not, the
cause of adverse health conditions suffered by many downwind residents;
3) some 4,400 sheep deaths in Nevada and Utah were attributable to
nuclear fallout and ranchers should be compensated; and 4) some type of
legislative compensation program was needed because of the difficulties
of seeking compensation under the Federal Tort Claims Act (Boutte, 2002,
pp. 43-44).
These Congressional hearings prompted Congress to propose and eventually
pass the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act.
Three Mile Island
Following the Three Mile Island accident, various lawsuits were filed in
State and Federal courts in Pennsylvania, seeking compensation for injuries and
property damage. From these legal battles, several radiation litigation precedents
were established. In the cases of O'Connor v Commonwealth Edison Company
and In re TMI, the court concluded that a radiation dose within the permissible
dose limits cannot result in liability to a person who received that dose. Although
the principle of ALARA (As Low as Reasonably Achievable) keeps doses lower
than the established numerical dose limits set by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the court ruled that a jury cannot set its own dose limits in
negligence cases under the pretext of applying ALARA (Riley, 2003).
Within weeks of the Three Mile Island accident, a class action suit was
filed against Metropolitan Edison Company (a subsidiary of General Public
Utilities) on behalf of all the businesses and residents within 25 miles of the plant.
Ten test cases were chosen by the Pennsylvania district court from over 2,000
personal injury claims alleging a variety of health injuries caused by gamma
radiation exposure. After numerous appeals, in June 1996, district court judge
Sylvia Rambo dismissed the lawsuit granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.
The first issue the court focused on was whether or not plaintiffs were
exposed to radiation released from Three Mile Island during the Three Mile
Island Accident. Judge Rambo ruled that the plaintiffs were unable to identify
which radionuclides were released from TMI during the accident and in what
quantities they were released. However, the plaintiffs were most likely exposed to
minimal levels of ionizing radiation (under 100 mR) since the defendants
conceded that readings at the plant boundaries exceeded the 0.5 R regulatory
threshold during the accident.
The next issue considered was whether or not radiation released from
Three Mile Island was the cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. The court ruled that it
could not find the defendant liable because the plaintiffs were unable to provide
evidence of exposure to a dose of radiation capable of inducing their neoplasms
(in excess of 10 rems). The testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness was
dismissed as purely speculative (Public Broadcasting Service). Thus, by
providing actual radiation reading at the plant boundaries at the time of the
accident, the defendant was able to absolve itself of causation since the plaintiff's
were unable to provide substantial evidence to support their claim.
In lieu of Three Mile Island, a new type of radiation injury was developed:
the nuclear phobia. Nuclear phobia describes the harm and consequences
associated with fear and nervous shock of being involved in or having someone
close associated with a nuclear incident. The issue surrounding nuclear phobia is
whether or not it should be considered psychological damage. If it is
psychological damage, should it be compensable? In the United States, the case
Metropolitan Edison v People against Nuclear Energy et al served as a test case
to determine the court's opinion on the issue of nuclear phobia. Although the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) was required to consider whether the risk of an accident after
the restart of the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear plant might psychologically
harm the community surrounding Three Mile Island, the United States Supreme
Court reversed this decision. The Supreme Court ruled that the risk of another
accident was not an effect on the physical community. In addition, "the causal
chain from renewed operation of TMI-1 to psychological health damage was too
attenuated" (Riley, 2003, p. 308). Thus, the precedent was set that nuclear
phobia is not compensable in the United States.
Suggestions for Improving the Compensation Systems
After analyzing the existing compensation systems, it is evident that the
most efficient system would combine elements from both the civilian (Price-
Anderson Act) and military (Radiation Exposure Compensation Act) practices.
First, the point of issuing compensation payments is to correct an injustice
inflicted on a population. Thus, reparations should be in the form of redress, in
that an official statement of apology should be included. This is not present in the
Price-Anderson Act since no liability is assumed by the private company that
owns the nuclear reactor.
To ensure the public that the compensation policies will in fact protect their
interests and help pay their medical expenses, the compensation fund should
have money available for immediate withdrawal. This would require a change in
the organization of the Price-Anderson Act in that retrospective contributions to
the fund will have to be eliminated. Nuclear reactors should be required to
deposit at least a fraction of their retrospective payments into an account held by
the United States Treasury to be dispensed in the event of an accidental
radiological release in excess of primary insurance coverage. This is similar to
the RECA Trust Fund. The military compensation system should be adjusted to
mimic the Price-Anderson Act in that all responsible parties should have to
contribute to the fund. In other words, each military branch - Army, Air Force,
Navy, etc. - should contribute money from their allotted annual budget to prevent
the federal government from having to produce compensation funds by
decreasing funding to other groups.
Finally, there should be no statute of limitations within a claimant's lifetime
and only the next immediate generation's birth defects should be compensable.
In the event that a person's lifetime is shortened by a compensable disease, the
surviving beneficiary should have ten years to collect the appropriate documents
and file a claim. To relieve the heavy burden of proof, in cases with reasonable
doubt regarding whether or not to compensate a claim, judgment for the claim
should be in favor of the claimant. Moreover, instead of trying to exclude
undeserving claimants based on rigid definitions of lifestyle choices (such as the
pack a year definition of a smoker), risk analysis should be performed to set an
upper limit of consumption where risk doubles or triples. Claimants falling into
consumption rates exceeding the upper limit will no longer be given the benefit of
the doubt. Moreover, eligibility document requirements for cultural groups such
as the Native Americans should be relaxed to include tribal records as official
documents.
Conclusion
While the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act is unique to the case of
the Nevada Test Site, it can be generalized to all military operations just as the
Price-Anderson Act applies to all nuclear reactor operations. The weaknesses of
each system involve debatable issues such as what should be compensated,
determining compensation eligibility, and setting standards for proving eligibility.
There is no clear, correct way of addressing these issues. Compensation
systems should simply incorporate lessons learned from previous case studies
such as the Nevada Test Site and Three Mile Island compensation schemes in
order to actively correct obvious flaws in the system.
With stricter safety guidelines and a heightened awareness of the effects
of radiation exposure, why is the issue of compensation still a concern in the 21st
century? First, none of the existing compensation systems include how to deal
with acts of nuclear terrorism. If a population is exposed to a dirty bomb or even
worse an atomic bomb, who is responsible for compensating the victims? Should
the federal government have to pay claims for failure to protect its citizens or
should an international trial be conducted mandating that reparations be paid by
the responsible party or country such as German reparations following World
War I? In addition, the United States may venture into nuclear endeavors that are
neither totally civilian nor totally military activities. In cases of combined civilian
and military efforts, which type of compensation system should be followed?
Finally, with the future plans to use Yucca Mountain as a spent fuel
repository, it is necessary to define a compensation system for accidental
exposure to nearby populations. In order to correct some of the problems of the
past, attention should be given to the Nevada Test Site example. Lessons
learned in that case include: implementing stricter monitoring of dose levels and
wind patterns and analyzing of the risk of radioactive material leaking into the
water table. Should we wait until nearby populations begin to exhibit radiation
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related diseases or should we develop a compensation system ahead of time so
that claims may be awarded immediately? It is clear that issues concerning
liability for radiation exposure compensation will be prevalent in American society
until definitive dose-response curves are developed. Until then, compensation
systems will have to be unique to the radiological source/event of the exposure.
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